For example, recent video LDMs can generate more than 16 frames, but GPUs with 24 GB memory can only perform gradient-based decoder inversion for 4 frames.

In latent diffusion models (LDMs), denoising diffusion process efficiently takes place on latent space whose dimension is lower than that of pixel space. Decoder is typically used to transform the representation in latent space to that in pixel space. While a decoder is assumed to have an encoder as an accurate inverse, exact encoder-decoder pair rarely exists in practice even though applications often require precise inversion of decoder. In other words, encoder is not the left-inverse but the right-inverse of the decoder; decoder inversion seeks the left-inverse. Prior works for decoder inversion in LDMs employed gradient descent inspired by inversions of generative adversarial networks. However, gradient-based methods require larger GPU memory and longer computation time for larger latent space.

In latent diffusion models (LDMs), denoising diffusion process efficiently takes place on latent space whose dimension is lower than that of pixel space. Decoder is typically used to transform the representation in latent space to that in pixel space. While a decoder is assumed to have an encoder as an accurate inverse, exact encoder-decoder pair rarely exists in practice even though applications often require precise inversion of decoder. Prior works for decoder inversion in LDMs employed gradient descent inspired by inversions of generative adversarial networks. However, gradient-based methods require larger GPU memory and longer computation time for larger latent space. For example, recent video LDMs can generate more than 16 frames, but GPUs with 24 GB memory can only perform gradient-based decoder inversion for 4 frames. Here, we propose an efficient gradient-free decoder inversion for LDMs, which can be applied to diverse latent models. Theoretical convergence property of our proposed inversion has been investigated not only for the forward step method, but also for the inertial Krasnoselskii-Mann (KM) iterations under mild assumption on cocoercivity that is satisfied by recent LDMs. Our proposed gradient-free method with Adam optimizer and learning rate scheduling significantly reduced computation time and memory usage over prior gradient-based methods and enabled efficient computation in applications such as noise-space watermarking while achieving comparable error levels.

Machine learning models have achieved great success in supervised learning tasks for end-to-end training, which requires a large amount of labeled data that is not always feasible. Recently, many practitioners have shifted to self-supervised learning methods that utilize cheap unlabeled data to learn a general feature extractor via pre-training, which can be further applied to personalized downstream tasks by simply training an additional linear layer with limited labeled data. However, such a process may also raise concerns regarding data poisoning attacks. For instance, indiscriminate data poisoning attacks, which aim to decrease model utility by injecting a small number of poisoned data into the training set, pose a security risk to machine learning models, but have only been studied for end-to-end supervised learning. In this paper, we extend the exploration of the threat of indiscriminate attacks on downstream tasks that apply pre-trained feature extractors. Specifically, we propose two types of attacks: (1) the input space attacks, where we modify existing attacks to directly craft poisoned data in the input space. However, due to the difficulty of optimization under constraints, we further propose (2) the feature targeted attacks, where we mitigate the challenge with three stages, firstly acquiring target parameters for the linear head; secondly finding poisoned features by treating the learned feature representations as a dataset; and thirdly inverting the poisoned features back to the input space. Our experiments examine such attacks in popular downstream tasks of fine-tuning on the same dataset and transfer learning that considers domain adaptation. Empirical results reveal that transfer learning is more vulnerable to our attacks. Additionally, input space attacks are a strong threat if no countermeasures are posed, but are otherwise weaker than feature targeted attacks.